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Abstract
As multiple types of traffic converge onto one network (frequently wireless), enterprises face a tradeoff between effectiveness and security. Some types of traffic, such as voice-over-IP (VoIP), require
certain quality of service (QoS) guarantees to be effective. The end client platform is in the best position to know which packets deserve this special handling. In many environments (such as universities),
end users relish having control over their own machines. However, if end users administer their own
machines, nothing stops dishonest ones from marking undeserving traffic for high QoS. How can an
enterprise ensure that only appropriate traffic receives high QoS, while also allowing end users to retain
control over their own machines?
In this paper, we present the design and prototype of a solution, using SELinux, TCPA/TCG hardware, Diffserv, 802.1x, and EAP-TLS.

1 Introduction
Many enterprise IT infrastructures are experiencing “convergence.” Increasingly many types of information
services—such as telephony and multimedia—are moving onto users’ general-purpose computers, and onto
the network. Indeed, our university has already migrated to VoIP, and plans to run only one network in new
dormitories, instead of three (intranet, telephone, and cable TV).
However, in order to provide acceptable performance, some of these applications require the network to
ensure higher minimal QoS for their traffic. In a large campus environment, with users, occasionally uncooperative, who value individual and departmental autonomy over their machines, this situation creates a set
of challenges.
1. The network and the user machines need to conspire together to ensure that traffic from appropriate
applications receives the appropriate quality of service.
2. Rogue users, even with root access to their own machines, should not be able to steal high QoS for
traffic from applications that do not merit it.
3. The users need to otherwise retain the control over their own machines to which they are accustomed.
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Quality of Service Quality of Service (QoS) is a concept of how “good” offered networking services are.
QoS can be characterized by a number of specific parameters, ranging from low-level parameters, such as
packet loss and guaranteed bandwidth, to end-to-end notions, such as amount of delay and jitter. Delay is
how long it takes to send information from one end node to another. Jitter describes the variance of delay
when sending multiple packets. A packet can be lost when collision occurs or when router’s routing queue
is exhausted, resulting increased delay or jitter.
Specific applications may have specific QoS needs. For example, a multimedia network application might
need to reconstruct audio and video signals from a stream of packets it receives. If the application experiences delay, it gives a half-duplex feel to the users. If it experiences jitter, the audio and video signals get
interrupted causing distortion and unintelligible audio.
QoS architectures can provide QoS in terms of guaranteed services or differentiated services. Guaranteed
services can guarantee certain QoS for a network application. Thus, a network application can request the
minimal delay, jitter, packet loss for its traffic to the network. When using differentiated services, a network
application can have the network routers treat its traffic with special priority. The routers may expedite
the forwarding of the application’s packets or assure that the application’s packets do not get dropped.
Differentiated services, however, do not make any guarantees on QoS.
Two networking architectures dominate current practice for QoS. Differentiated Services (Diffserv) [10, 31,
21, 23, 14, 12, 9, 19, 4, 3, 9] is an example of differentiated services. In contrast, Integrated Services (Intserv)
[6, 5, 37, 38, 45, 44, 36, 15] offers guaranteed services. While Intserv gives the network more control over
which application can be given specific QoS, Diffserv’s approach is more simple and scalable.
Theft However, when Bob authorizes Alice to use his QoS-enabled network, he wants to make sure that
Alice does not abuse the QoS architecture. For example, Bob may want to enforce that Alice’s peer-to-peer
file sharing traffic, which Alice modified to resemble VoIP traffic, does not hoard the network resources that
other user’s VoIP traffic needs. To guard against this kind of theft of QoS, Bob would set up a QoS policy
that dictates what level of QoS that Alice’s applications should receive.
Current QoS networking architectures enforce their QoS policies at the routers or gateways. These inspect
the packets themselves, to determine which deserve higher QoS. Routers and gateways, however, cannot
gather enough information from packet inspection to identify which application at the end nodes generated
the packets—especially when the end nodes can shape their low priority traffic to appear as high priority
traffic. Routers and gateways may attempt to use information in the packets—hardware address, IP address,
port number, application protocol number, length of the data, identifiable patterns in the data. However,
many existing techniques, such as MAC address spoofing and IP address spoofing, can easily change these
values and bypass QoS policy enforcement at the router or gateway.
The Problem Standard QoS networking architectures thus require that the network believes the applicationlabeling information that end nodes put on packets—except the root users on some end nodes may wish to
cheat. We need a way to ensure that the network can believe this information, despite such adversaries,
while still providing users with open computing environments.
Our Solution In this project, we provide a solution to this problem using trusted computing hardware now
becoming commercially ubiquitous. To gain access to the network, an end node must prove knowledge of
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a private key. A kernel-level module at the end node can use this private key—and also is responsible for
marking the QoS level on packets. When operating correctly, this module will follow the enterprise’s QoS
policy. Integrating measurements of the operating environment for this module into an on-board trusted
platform module (TPM) ensures (for some level of adversary) that the module can use the private key only
when it is operating correctly. Building this in Linux permits users to otherwise have freedom in configuring
their machines; using the NSA’s SELinux variant further protects against malicious users with root access.
This project builds on the previous Enforcer Linux and SELinux project [29, 28, 16], and uses the 1.1b TPM
from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) (formerly the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, TCPA)
[41, 40].
This Paper Section 2 reviews the building blocks of our design. Section 3 describes how we put these
pieces together and presents the big picture of the proposed system. Section 4 discusses our prototype
and presents some performance measurements. Section 5 provides a security analysis. Section 6 discusses
related work. Section 7 concludes with some directions for future work.

2 Building Blocks
2.1

The Diffserv Architecture

We need a network architecture to provide quality of service.
Differentiated Services (Diffserv) [10] is a QoS architecture that categorizes network traffic into QoS classes
so that traffic of a higher priority class receives better QoS than the traffic that belongs to a lower priority
class. Diffserv appears to be the QoS architecture most widely used in practice.
Diffserv consists of following components: packet classification, packet marking and per hop behavior
(PHB) enforcement. In Diffserv, network QoS policies divide network traffic into different QoS classes.
The Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) value in the Differentiated Services (DS) field1 in the IP
header is used to classify a packet. The network specifies what type of packets belong to which class
and maps the classes to different DSCPs (packet classfication). Ingress network nodes, such as border
routers and gateways, inspect packets and mark the DSCP of each packet according to the QoS policy of
the network (packet marking). Other routers of the network then handle the packet according to the QoS
level associated with the DSCP value of the packet (PHB enforcement). PHB mechanisms, such as assured
forwarding(AF) [21] and expedited forwarding (EF) [23], are used to provide better QoS to the traffic with
higher priority.
As we discussed in Section 1, because the ingress network nodes do not know which application is issuing
the packets, they must rely on the information within the header of each packet when they classify and
mark the packets. This limitation hinders the network administrator from making an application-level QoS
policy. Once the attacker figures out the packet-level QoS policy, the attacker can form low-priority packets
to resemble high priority packets to bypass the QoS policy enforcement. See Figure 1.
Thus, it is desirable to move classification and marking to the end nodes that produce the packets, where we
know which applications are issuing the packets. Then we can have more fine-grained, application-based
1 The DS field supercedes the IPv4 Type of Service octet and the IPv6 Traffic Classifier octet.
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Figure 1: In Diffserv, because the ingress network node does not know what application issued the packets, its
classification of traffic is based on packet inspection. However, packet inspection does not offer any control over
what applications are allowed in the network. Thus, End Node 1 can get all its packets—including the ones issued by
malwares in its machine—classified “Gold” by using a modified network hardware driver that can spoof the source
MAC address. Furthermore, End Node 2 can get all of its peer-to-peer file sharing traffic marked “Premium” by
hacking the program to modify the packets to resemble VoIP traffic, which often uses RTP protocol and destination
port 5004.

QoS policy. However, this approach works only if we can guarantee that all the end nodes will obey the
network QoS policy when marking the DSCP field of the packets. We can provide such guarantees using
trusted computing.

2.2

TCG Hardware

We need a way for the network to be able to trust the QoS labeling carried out on end nodes.
Trusted computing tries to answer the the following question: how can Alice trust computation that occurs
in Bob’s computer? The TCG has come up with an answer for general-purpose computing platforms that
targets a tradeoff between affordability and security. In the TCG design, a Trusted Platform Module [41, 40]
measures and attests the configuration of Bob’s computer to Alice. The TPM can provide further assistance
in security protocols by providing sealed storage that binds data (such as private or secret keys) to a specific
configuration of Bob’s computer.
In the PC implementation, the TPM is mounted on the motherboard and (in careful interleaving with bootstrap) measures the host machine’s hardware and software configuration to sixteen platform configuration
registers (PCRs) in the form of SHA-1 digests, loaded in a one-way format. The first eight PCRs are filled
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with hashes of BIOS, hardware configurations, ROM, the bootloader and its configuration. The usage of
the other eight PCRs is up to OS and application designers, and may be used to record the configuration of
the applications and drivers. As noted earlier, the TPM can also seal data items to the system configuration,
as represented by a suite of specific PCR values. If a data item is an RSA private key, the TPM can also
be configured to never unseal it—but rather only perform the RSA private key operation when the system
configuration is appropriate.
The 1.1b TPM has been shipping on many IBM platforms for several years. A 1.2 version has been announced, but (at the time of our experiments) was not yet available.
Whether or not one agrees with the TCPA/TCG architecture or some of its potential commercial applications,
two facts remain. This hardware is becoming commercially ubiquitous, so a feasible deployment base exists
if one wants to build a trusted computing application. Also, the specifications for the TPMs are public, so
one can build to it.

2.3

The Enforcer LSM

We need a way for the end node OS to actually work with the TPM.
The TCG has specified a TCG Software Stack (TSS), and an open-source implementation of this recently
became available [32]. Marchesini et al. also provided an open-source integration of the TPM with Linux,
independent of the TSS [29]. Sailer et al. presented a design extending the TSS approach to the application
layer in Linux [35].
For our experiments, we chose the Enforcer platform [16].
The TPM architecture binds data to host configuration. Standard PKI-based authentication and authorization
systems use a keypair, whose private key belongs to that entity and whose public key has been certified by
some authority. Using such a scheme in a TPM-equipped host naturally suggests using the TPM to bind
this private key to the host configuration. The configuration of the host machine, however, may change
frequently as a trivial file is changed. Does such a change preserve the original entity, or not? If so, do
rebind the secret somehow, or must the host make another trip to the CA?
The Enforcer architecture solves the problem by separating the configuration of a host machine into three
levels: long-lived kernel and hardware configuration, medium-lived software, and short-lived operational
data.
The Enforcer software includes modified boot code and a Linux Security Module (LSM). For PKI-based host
authentication, the Enforcer uses the TPM to tie the use of the RSA private key to a known, trusted long-lived
configuration of the host machine through the use of PCRs. Figure 2 illustrates the long-lived configuration
of the host machine reported by the PCRs. During the boot-up of the host, the PCRs are populated with
with measurements reflecting the hardware configuration, and key software such as BIOS, the kernel, and
the Enforcer code. If the PCRs matches the known configuration, then the TPM makes secrets available to
the Enforcer for that boot cycle. One of these secrets is a private key matching a public key that has been
certified in an X.509 identity certificate isssued for this machine.
For medium-lived software and files, a remote Security Admin issues a signed policy which describes a
file structure that it believes to be trustworthy. The Enforcer, at the beginning of each boot cycle, checks
the signature of the Security Admin’s policy and loads the policy into the memory. To prevent from using a
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Figure 2: Enforcer’s long-lived configuration. The TPM reports the configuration of hardwares, BIOS, ROMS, and
the bootloader in the first 8 PCRs. The Enforcer uses PCRs 8–12 to report the configuration of the rest of the long-lived
components.

forged policy, the Security Admin’s public key is hashed in a PCR and is part of the long-lived configuration,
so if an attacker tries to modify the public key file, the secret bound the long-lived configuration becomes
not accessible. At run time, the Enforcer intercepts relevant syscalls touching files and checks them against
this policy.
Finally, the short-lived operational data is protected through the use of an encrypted loopback filesystem. If
tamper is detected in the long-lived or medium-lived configuration, the Enforcer can unmount the filesystem
and deny the access to the secret necessary to decrypt the data.
Marchesini et al. [29] showed that the Enforcer platform can be used protect the integrity of SSL server to
give higher level of assurance to its customer that the private key is well-protected. In their implementation,
Apache Web server’s private key is bound to the long-lived configuration of the Enforcer platform and is
certified by the CA that vouches for the Enforcer kernel. The Enforcer enforces the medium-lived configuration of Apache, necessary scripts, and libraries through the use of the Security Admin’s policy. Finally,
operational data is kept in the encrypted loopback filesystem.

2.4

Adding SELinux

We need a way to protect against malicious root users.
Even with TCG hardware, the superuser in the traditional Unix/Linux access control model can nullify the
binding between the configuration and the secret. For example, the superuser can use a debugger to read
the memory location where the secret is loaded after it is released from the TPM. To solve this problem,
Marchesini et al., in their later work [28] added Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) to the Enforcer to
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provide software compartments to limit the superuser. SELinux [27, 26] is a Flask-based operating system
that offers mandatory role-based access control. In the mandatory role-based access control model, a policy
assigns roles to subjects—processes and users—and types to objects—memory locations, devices, files and
sockets—and then describes how the subjects in each role can access the objects in each type. Using the
mandatory role-based access control policy, SELinux can confine each application to its own compartment
of objects called domain. Separating objects in the system into separate domains can, thus, prevent the
superuser from spying on arbitrary memory location of the domain where it does not have permission to
read memory.

3 Putting the Building Blocks Together
TCG hardware with Enforcer and SELinux provides a practical way to bind a secret to trustworthy kernellevel code, which in turn can use a host-specific private key only when the rest of the machine abides by
some policy schema. In the SSL example, the Enforcer will not export the SSL private key outside the use
of Apache web server, and ensures that the server can use it only when it is configured according to the latest
safety guidelines and the Web content is suitably guarded by the OS.
We can use a similar approach to solve the QoS theft problem. We choose a standard PKI scheme to require
authorization for network access. We set up the trusted module at the end node to know the host’s secret—
and also to ensure that packets exiting the machine into the secure tunnel are marked correctly according to
the network’s QoS policy.

3.1

Distributed Packet Marking

We introduce an additional remote party called the QoS Admin, who, similar to the Security Admin, issues a
signed policy. This policy maps each network application to a DSCP. During the machine’s bootup process,
the QoS Admin’s public key is also loaded into the PCR along with the Security Admin’s public key, and
the policy’s signature is verified when the Enforcer loads the policy. The QoS Admin may need to consult
the Security Admin policy when creating the QoS policy, since what an application does when executed
can depend on other aspects of the system configuration besides the binary. Additionally, by granting an
application the right to use a high QoS, the QoS Admin may also be granting that right to forked children.
Figure 3(a) describes how our kernel-level code can correctly identify the mapping between the packets
and network applications. We added socket hooks to the Enforcer/SELinux LSM so that when an INET or
INET6 type sockets are created, it records the socket’s inode number, the program that created it, and the
DSCP for the program in the QoS Admin’s policy. The hook verifies that the program is listed in the Security
Admin’s policy and looks up the QoS Admin’s policy for the hash of the program and the corresponding
DSCP. If the program is not in the Security Admin’s policy, the socket is not recorded and all the packets
issued from the socket will be dropped. Moreover, if the DSCP for the program is not specified in the policy,
the packets from the socket will be assigned the default DSCP and will receive best-of-effort service from
the routers.
Figure 3(b) shows how we use the recorded socket inode and DSCP value to mark the outgoing packets.
Packet marking happens at a POSTROUTING Netfilter hook [34] in the kernel IP stack to capture all outgoing packets at the IP layer just before it is sent to the network driver. (Netfilter is firewall utility integrated
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(a) Socket hooks.

(b) Marking DSCP.

Figure 3: Socket and Netfilter Hooks. (a) We added hooks to socket syscalls to map socket inode numbers to programs.
We then use this mapping to identify which programs are issuing which packets. If the socket is created by a program
that is not listed in the Security Admin’s policy, the hook does not record the socket inode; all the packets issued from
such a socket to get dropped at the kernel IP stack. The hook also finds the DSCP for the program in the QoS Admin’s
policy and records this value along with the socket’s inode number. If the QoS Admin’s policy does not include the
program, then the hook records the default DSCP. (b) The Netfilter POSTROUTING hook at the kernel IP stack uses
the recorded socket inode and DSCP values to mark the DS field of the IP packet before the packet is sent to the device
driver. If the hook does not recognize the socket inode, then the packet is dropped.
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in the Linux kernels since version 2.4.) The Netfilter hook looks up the socket inode where the packet is
coming from. If the socket is recorded, then it modifies the packet’s DSCP value with the recorded DSCP.
If the socket is not recorded, then the hook drops the packet.

3.2

Network Authorization

To restrict network access only to machines with trustworthy QoS markings, we use Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) client authentication [1] for network authorization.
EAP-TLS is a PKI-based authentication method for 802.1x port-based access control. In EAP-TLS authentication, the client holds a keypair and a certificate that is signed by a CA the network trusts. The client
gains the access by proving to the network’s authentication server the knowledge of his private key.

3.3

Big Picture

Figure 5 (appended after the paper) shows how the components of our system fit together. In our approach,
the client’s platform generates an RSA keypair and binds the private key to the long-lived configuration of
the platform. An enterprise CA certifies the public key and issues a certificate vouching for the long-lived
configuration of the client’s platform.
In our current design, the private key file of the platform lives in the encrypted loopback filesystem, which is
only accessible when the Enforcer is in the configuration that the private key is bound to. The Enforcer and
SELinux limits the access to the key only to the 802.1x supplicant program that does not export the key or
make visible to other processes. The Enforcer also detects integrity changes to the medium-lived software
using the Security Admin’s Policy.
During EAP-TLS authentication, the authentication server verifies that the certificate is signed by the enterprise CA and that the client has the knowledge of the private key. From these two facts, the authentication
server can deduce that the client is in a “good” configuration, in which the Enforcer/SELinux will mark the
packets according to the QoS Admin’s policy. Figure 4 shows the resulting security functionality.
The power of our design lies in the non-restrictiveness of the approach. Our usage of the Enforcer/SELinux
LSM allows Alice to have the freedom to administer her platform and add/remove applications as she wishes.
The only restriction is that, should Alice want non-default network QoS, she needs to install an application
that has been approved by the QoS Admin, in a configuration blessed by the Security Admin. SELinux
compartmentalization will help here. Alice also cannot load arbitrary kernel modules (in the current architecture), since that could compromise the packet marking.

4 Prototype Implementation and Performance
We implemented our design on an IBM Thinkpad T40 with Pentium M 1.3GHz, 256MB RAM, TPM 1.1b,
and Intel Wireless Pro 2100 device, running Linux kernel 2.6.11 with the -mm patch [30] and Debian testing
distribution. This Thinkpad came pre-installed with a 1.1b TPM, and the kernel we used included the driver
for the TPM. We also used libtpm 2.0 from IBM [25] as the TPM library code. For SELinux libraries
and utilities, we used Russell Coker’s SELinux Debian packages [13]. We used the experimental Enforcer
LSM patch that works with the SELinux LSM.
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Figure 4: By moving the enforcement to each end node, we can enforce an application-based QoS policy. Coupled
with the TPM’s integrity protection of the platform (through binding the secret to the measured configuration), the
Enforcer’s intrusion detection mechanism can also identify and blacklist malware and maliciously modified programs.
Moreover, note that TPM detects at boot time that the End Node 1 modified the hardware network driver and denies
access to the authentication private key.
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For 802.1x EAP-TLS client authentication, we used xsupplicant version 1.0.1 [46]. In addition, we also
wrote a QoS Admin utility, which, using a configuration file, can build QoS Admin’s policy and sign it using
QoS Admin’s private key.
To limit the power of the superuser account, we added new roles to the SELinux policy for the Security
Admin and the QoS Admin. We restricted access to the Security Admin’s policy and the QoS Admin’s
policy to the users who have these roles. We also added a domain for xsupplicant and all the kernel driver
modules used for the wireless device, and restricted access to the domain to prevent the superuser from
spying the shared key for network encryption. Finally, we created a domain for the TPM library functions
and the TPM driver and restricted access to the domain to prevent the superuser from spying the private key
for network authentication is loaded.
With the LSM framework, one can implement one’s own socket hook functions, such as socket_create(),
socket_post_create(), socket_bind(), and socket_connect(). These hook functions get
called when user code makes socket syscalls such as socket(), bind(), and connect(). We modified socket_post_create() and socket_shutdown() to bookkeep which applications are using
which sockets. Because a socket is completely shut down only when the close() syscall is called, we
added an an LSM hook in the close() syscall to see which sockets get deleted. We also added a Netfilter
hook function that gets called when a packet arrives in the predefined hooks in the kernel IP stack, called
trustednet_ip_postroute_last(). This function captures all the packets right before they leave
the kernel IP stack, and marks each packet according to the recorded DSCP value for the socket it is coming
from. If no value is recorded, the function drops the packet. We also perform bookkeeping to detect packets
a machine is sending to itself. Our bookkeeping occurs after the SELinux hook functions since SELinux
policy may prevent the socket from being created and the packets from leaving the machine.
To evaluate the performance of our implementation, we measured how long the added hooks take to mark
the packets. We measured the added latencies for the following five applications: linphone, a VoIP
application, ices, audio streaming program, firefox, a Web browser, exim4, mail-transfer agent ,
and ssh/sftp, secure shell and file transfer protocol. We note that the time that the socket calls take is
generally dependent on how much computing resources are available. If the platform runs out of physical
memory and has to page and swap, the performance degrades dramatically. The maximum numbers reflect
such events.
The socket hook operation is time-consuming, since we have to calculate the hash of the program to compare
with the entry in the Security Admin’s policy, and it also has to search the DSCP for the program in the
QoS Admin’s policy. Thus, the time that socket hook takes is proportional to the size of the program
binary for which it has to calculate the hash. Table 1 shows the added latency for the socket hook for
socket_post_create(). Even though the socket hook operation is costly, the program only needs to
do this once to create the socket prior communication. Thus, the number of times socket hooks are called
much less often than the Netfilter hooks.
The Netfilter hook operation is less costly, as shown in Table 2, since all it needs to do is look up the packet’s
socket inode number in the recorded values and mangle the DS field in the IP packet. The operation occurs
much more frequently than the socket hook operations since a single socket may issue multiple packets.
Performance benchmarks for some specialized hardware show that Diffserv marking can be done without
any added latency[20]. Thus, our approach may introduce some latency to the end-to-end communication
that uses traditional. However, according to the International Telecommunications Union [18], the recom-
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Min
Max
Average

linphone
2275
47649
4859.47

ices
11550
11931
11655.25

firefox
5489
7938933
358324.71

exim4
14379
325801
24492

ssh/sftp
1529
212549
7065.02

Table 1: Added latency by the socket hook (µs).

Min
Max
Average

linphone
4
3822
8.722

ices
4
2083
17.74

firefox
4
5301
18.821

exim4
5
34
11.4835

ssh/sftp
4
12926
40.5053

Table 2: Added lantency by the Netfilter hook (µs).

mended maximum round trip delay in a voice system is 0 to 150 milliseconds. Thus, the time that the local
packet marking adds is easily absorbed in the total round trip time.
In summary, we showed that our implementation does not hinder the performance of the network applications. Furthermore, because we are distributing the computation that the edge routers or gateways traditionally perform for all packets they serve, our solution is more scalable than the centralized traditional Diffserv
architecture.
Availability. Our code will be available for open-source download.

5 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss several possible threat models to our distributed QoS enforcement and show how
we can prevent them.
Since the DSCP marking happens at the kernel IP stack, it is possible for the attacker to modify the packet
after it is marked by the Enforcer and before it arrives at the network interface driver. In Linux, a user can
use netlink sockets and divert sockets to intercept, modify, reinject packets. We use SELinux to restrict
the permission to use these sockets that can interfere with the QoS marking rules. Note that many useful
programs, such as iptables firewall utility, use such sockets, however. Restricting netlink usage greatly
decreases the functionality of these programs. Alternately, we can also use digital signature to detect tamper
although this approach may greatly reduce the performance of the system.
The attacker may try to use another machine between the Enforcer platform and the network to try to modify
the packet. Because EAP-TLS authentication produces Medium Access Control (MAC) layer encryption
and integrity session keys, which encrypts the IP header of the packet, the attacker needs to migrate the
session key to the untrusted man-in-the-middle machine and modify the DSCP in the IP header. Again, we
use SELinux to ensure that the memory location of the session key is readable only by the network interface
driver. Furthermore, we use the Security Admin’s policy to include only the network interface driver which
does not reveal the session key to other processes. Moreover, we use SELinux to guard against the superuser.
12

The attacker can also try to stand between routers to modify the packets after they have been decrypted by
the access point or the switch. However, this attack requires physical access to the wires that connect the
routers and access points. Thus, when physical security is present, this attack is very hard to do.
We also discuss the benefits our various components offer.
The TPM alone offers configuration measurement of the platform and binding of an RSA private key to the
configuration of the platform so that the private key is only accessible only when the platform is in certain
configuration. However, in order to provide high assurance, the TPM, if used alone, needs to report the
comprehensive configuration of the platform including a snapshot of the filesystem. Thus, a small, trivial
change in the platform’s filesystem causes the secret key unaccessible.
The Enforcer LSM is added to break down the configuration of the platform into three levels—long-lived
kernel and hardware, medium-lived software and libraries, short-lived operational data—and to let the TPM
to bind the private key only to the long-lived configuration of the platform. The Enforcer LSM then works
as an intrusion-detection system for the medium-lived componenets, enforcing the Security Admin’s signed
policy. The Enforcer LSM also provides encrypted storage for the short-lived configuration and can bind
the secret key to the long-lived configuration, so that the encrypted data is only accessible when the correct
version of the Enforcer is running. Thus, through the use of the Enforcer LSM, the small change that would
have made the private key inaccessible would not affect the access to the private key in the Enforcer-assisted
TPM.
However, the TPM and the Enforcer alone cannot prevent the superuser of the platform from spying the
memory location where the secret is loaded from the TPM. Furthermore, the Enforcer alone can suffer
from time-of-check/time-of-use attacks if the user can modify the memory location that stores the Security
Admin’s policy. SELinux is added to provide software compartments to protect the Enforcer platform from
the superuser. It also gives more strict control over all the objects in the platform, including memory, to
ensure that implicit flow of confidential information does not occur.

6 Related Work
Trusted Computing Our work is similar to Trusted Network Connect (TNC) [43], an ongoing effort by the
Trusted Computing Group to enforce security for end-point host connections. The goal that TNC is trying
to achieve is different from our work, however. TNC focuses on protecting the end nodes from malware and
ties the security level of end nodes to the level of access to the network. Our work differs in several respects.
We are trying to secure not just network authorization, but QoS markings as well; we are also distinguishing
not just good nodes from bad nodes, but also between applications within nodes.
The specification of TNC has not been finalized yet. Current sources [42] indicate plans to use VLANs and
802.1x with EAP and Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS).
Secure QoS Intserv is a signal-based QoS architecture, where the node desiring better QoS makes a request to the network via Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) [11] and reserves network resources such
as bandwidth and drop rate for the connection. There have been some work to secure RSVP messages from
modification and eavesdropping [2, 39, 7]. However, they focus on outsider attacks and do not address insider attacks. Moreover, because Intserv requires the routers keep track of the flow that has reserved certain
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resources, it is not as scalable and popular as Diffserv.
IEEE 802.11e The IEEE 802.11e working group is currently working on MAC-layer QoS for 802.11
wireless networks [22]. Zhu, et al. [47] give a good survey of the QoS schemes in the MAC-layer.
MAC-layer QoS for wireless networks focuses on a different problem from IP-layer QoS. Because an access
point can service only one wireless node at a time, when more than one node transmits a packet at the same
time, a collision occurs and the nodes must retransmit after a back-off period. In wireless QoS schemes, the
nodes that are sending high priority traffic might back off for a shorter period of time than the nodes that are
sending low priority traffic. However, misbehaving nodes may always back off for a short enough time to
always win the transmission opportunity.
Some resarchers have proposed solutions to this greedy misbehavior [24, 33, 8]. These solutions use probabilistic algorithms for detecting MAC-layer misbehavior. Thus, it is possible for sophisticated attackers to
bypass the detection, and the detection scheme can mistake a well-behaving node to be misbehaving.
In our design, we have the Security Admin approve only the network interface drivers that is tested to not
misbehave. Thus, the users who wish to authenticate to the network cannot use network interface drivers
that are not approved by the Security Admin.

7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we described a design and prototype of distributed enforcement of the network’s QoS policy
using trusted computing hardware, open source trusted computing tools, and Diffserv. In the Diffserv architecture, the network applications can receive the necessary QoS by classifying its traffic as a certain class by
marking all of its outgoing packets. However, the enforcers of the network’s QoS policy, such as the edge
routers or gateways, are unaware of which network applications issued the packets they see, especially if
malicious node can modify the low priority traffic to resemble the high priority traffic.
Thus, we argued that it would be ideal to move the enforcing to the end nodes, which are aware of the
mapping between the outgoing packets and the programs as long as we can trust that each node will obey
the network’s QoS policy. We used trusted computing to bind the node’s network authentication secret to
the node’s configuration that obeys the network’s QoS policy. Using our design, we allow all authenticated
nodes to mark the packets, and at the same time we are assured that node’s marking obeys the QoS policy of
the network. We implemented our design by adding socket and Netfilter hooks to the Enforcer LSM and by
binding the node’s private key for EAP-TLS authentication to the modified Enforcer with marking abilities.
We showed that our implementation does not suffer performance and increases scalability due to distribution
of marking duties.
Several areas remain for future work.
Policy Update Verification Currently, there is no way for the authentication server to know whether the
policies of the Security Admin and the QoS Admin in the end node’s Enforcer platform is up-to-date; the
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server knows only that the policy the Enforcer is enforcing has a valid signatures2 . Once an update is
released, it is the responsibility of the Security Admin and the QoS Admin to patch the system in timely
fashion. Although it is possible to attest the policies to an unused PCR in the TPM and map the new
configuration to the certificate, this idea goes against the Enforcer’s design of separating the medium-lived
software configuration from the long-lived core. Moreover, adding attestation to EAP-TLS authentication
may require changes to the current standards.
We are thinking of ways to allow the Enforcer, rather than the TPM, attest the medium-lived core’s policy.
This idea allows the attestation hierarchy to match the hierarchy of the configuration. We propose the use
of X509 attribute certificates [17] in conjunction with the enterprise certificate for EAP-TLS authentication.
In our proposed scheme, in the beginning of each boot cycle, after the Enforcer/SELinux LSM checks the
signature of the Security Admin’s policy and the QoS Admin’s policy, the Enforcer/SELinux LSM generates
attribute certificates for these two policies and signs them with the authentication private key—thus vouching
for the timestamp, version number, and issuers of the policies. When the Enforcer platform authenticates
to the network, it presents these attribute certificates along with the network certificate to the authentication
server so that the authentication server can find out what version of the policy the platform is enforcing.
Since EAP-TLS authentication supports validation of a chain of certificates, we are hoping that using the
attribute certificates may save us from making any changes to the standard EAP-TLS authentication protocol.
Automated Policy Update Policy update verification is also useful when the Enforcer platform is used
in multiple domains that have different QoS policies. Thus, it is desirable for the Enforcer platform to
keep multiple QoS policies signed by different QoS Admins, and use the appropriate one when crossing the
domain. For users who may not have multiple policies installed, it would be ideal to support dynamic update
of the QoS policy. In this model, the network detects a Enforcer platform which is not properly configured
with the policy that the network approves. By creating an “quarantined” VLAN, we can limit the user’s
network access to where the user can download the signed QoS policy of the network. Once the policy’s
signature is checked, the Enforcer platform can restart using the updated QoS policy and be able to gain
access to the network.
Usability of Policy Writing In general, it can be hard to come up with a policy that matches the conceptual model and allows the system to operate correctly. If not carefully written, the policy may not deliver
the security that we need. Too restrictive policy may cause the system to lose important functionality. Dynamically linked executables requires the Security Admin to validate the linkers and dynamically loadable
libraries as well as the program binaries. In our current implementation, we included all the libraries and
modules and linkers in the Security Admin’s policy to increase assurance against attacks that use dynamically linked executables.
In our current implementation, the policies from the Security Admin and the QoS Admin are locally generated. The timestamps on executables cause the hashes of the binary compiled in different platform to be
unique, making it hard for the Security Admin and the QoS Admin to issue general, universal policies for
all the Enforcer/SELinux platforms. In order to support automatic policy update, we plan to investigate on
ways to make the policies more portable across different platforms.
2 The Enforcer does offer a way to record the serial number of the Security Admin’s policy it uses and to reject its use if the

policy’s serial number is less than the recorded one. This feature, however, only addresses rollback, not freshness.
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Usability of Open Platforms Another area of future work will be to validate, with user studies, that this
approach (a trustworthy network QoS module within SELinux) still results in a sufficiently flexible and
open platform to satisfy users who like to retain administrative control of their machines. Verification of the
SELinux policy (once we finish adapting it from the prior Enforcer work) will also be necessary.
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Appendix

Figure 5: Our modified Enforcer/SELinux platform. (This figure is based on Figure 2 in [28].) The Endorser CA
certifies that the TPM is genuine and its certificate comes with the hardware. The TPM vouches for the long-lived
configuration of the platform through the use of the value of the PCRs and binds the short-lived encryption key to it.
The Enterprise CA certifies the long-lived configuration of the platform and the TPM by issuing a certificate for the
platform’s network authentication keypair. The private key for network authentication should live in the encrypted
loopback filesystem (short-lived component), which is only accessible when the long-lived configuration matches the
value that the Enterprise CA certified. The long-lived components then protect the medium-lived components by
enforcing the Security Admin’s signed policy. When the long-lived components detect discrepancies between the
Security Admin’s policy and the medium-lived components, the Enforcer LSM will unmount the encrypted filesystem
and panic the kernel. We introduce another remote party called the QoS Admin who issues a signed application-based
QoS policy. The long-lived configuration also enforces the QoS Admin’s policy by marking all its outgoing packets
according to the policy. The authentication server can be assured that the platform will obey the network’s QoS policy
simply by the fact that the platform can prove the knowledge of the authentication private key, which is certified by
the Enterprise CA because the CA vouches for the fact that platform’s kernel will obey the QoS Admin’s policy.
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